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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1953
It is arguable that the issuance of such an order would not have been
merely an abuse of power or discretion, but would have been in excess
of the judge's power and, hence, beyond his jurisdiction. If so, this
would have been a proper basis for issuing a writ of prohibition.'3
WILLIAM E. LovE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Enrolled Bill Rule. In two recent decisions, Derby Club v. Beckett'
and Roehl v. Public Utility District,2 four members of the Supreme
Court have written opinions which challenge the validity of the enrolled
bill rule. In the Derby Club case, the 1951 act which purported to
license the operation of bottle clubs3 was attacked on the ground that
it was enacted in violation of Art. II, § 38 of the state constitution.'
The defendants demurred, but relied on the enrolled bill rule in their
argument on appeal. The majority of the court held the statute un-
constitutional on other grounds, but two concurring opinions were filed,
representing the views of four judges, in which the position was taken
that the court should abandon the enrolled bill rule. In the Roeld case,
the statute giving the Public Utility District authority to acquire sub-
stantially all of the electric utility properties of Puget Sound Power &
Light' was alleged to be invalid, also under Article II, § 38. In. support
of their contention, the plaintiffs introduced certified copies of several
House bills and the legislative journal. Having the enrolled bill rule
thus directly- raised in issue, the majority wrote an extensive opinion
adhering to the long line of Washington authority upholding the en-
rolled bill rule. The same judges that spoke against the enrolled bill
rule in the Derby Club case expressed their dissent in this case.'
discovery). RCW 4.56.120 (6) authorizes the court to grant a nonsuit when a defendant
fails to comply with an order of the court (presumably an order affecting pre-trial or
trial pleading or procedure), but there is no comparable statutory authority authorizing
a default judgment when a defendant refuses to obey an order. However, Rule 37(d)
does permit a court to grant a default judgment for the defendant's failure to comply
with an order involving discovery.
Is While the court did not decide the case on the propriety of the sanction which
the trial judge intended to impose, it did question the propriety of such an order
which would change the "status quo" between the parties prior to a trial on the merits.
141 Wn.2d 869, 252 P.2d 259 (1953).
2 143 Wash. Dec. 198, 261 P.2d 92 (1953).
3 RCW 66.24.480.
4 "No amendment to any bill shall be allowed which shall change the scope and
object of the bill." WAsH. Coxs=. ART. II, § 38.
5 RCW 80.40.054.
6 One of the judges who joined in the opinions against the enrolled bill rule in the
previous case voted with the majority in this case, so the decision was six to three.
However, in his concurring opinion, he stated that he still was not in favor of the rule.
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The enrolled bill rule, as set forth in the leading Washington case,
State ex rel. Reed v. Jones,' is that the enrolled bill on file in the office
of the secretary of state, which is duly signed by the presiding officers
of both houses,8 and otherwise appears fair upon its face, is conclusive
evidence of the regularity of all proceedings necessary for its proper
enactment in conformity with the constitutional provisions. The effect
of the rule is that the court will not consider evidence of the legislative
history of the bill, as revealed in the legislative journals or elsewhere, to
rebut the presumption of enactment in accordance with the constitu-
tional requisites. The rule has been applied to preclude allegations that
the bill in question was not properly repassed after the governor's veto,"
that the bill was passed by the legislature subsequent to the expiration
of the sixty-day period to which sessions of the legislature are limited
by the state constitution,"° and that an amendment changed the scope
and object of the bill." An investigation of the antecedent history of
the passage of a bill will not be made except as may be necessary in
case of ambiguity in the bill when the legislative intent must be deter-
mined."2
Although the enrolled bill rule has been adopted in many other
jurisdictions, including the federal,"3 there is much authority to the
contrary. It has, in fact, been suggested that the modern tendency is
to abandon the conclusive presumption of the enrolled bill rule and to
give weight to the legislative history of the bill as recorded in the
official journals." The rule is attacked on three grounds: (1) that the
enrollment is not a record and that the primary source of information
as to the constitutional passage of a bill is to be found in the legislative
journals;' 5 (2) that there is danger of error and fraud in the enrollment
procedure;'" and (3) that the doctrine prevents the enforcement of
the constitutional provisions relating to the passage of bills."
Such arguments have been forcibly answered by the authorities in
7 6 Wash. 452, 34 Pac. 201 (1893). Wigmore states that the opinion is "perhaps the
best on the subject." 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1350 (3d ed. 1940).
8 The authentication of bills and their enrollment with the secretary of state is
required by WASH. CONST. ART. II, § 32 and ART. III, § 17.
9 State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Board of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996
(1926).
10 Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935).
11 State ex rel. Bugge v. Martin, 38 Wn.2d 834, 232 P.2d 833 (1951).
12 Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wn.2d 498, 104 P.2d 478 (1940).
13 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
14 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§ 1402, 1405 (3d ed. 1943).
15 Fowler v. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165 (1852).
16 Bull v. King, 205 Minn. 427, 286 N.W. 311 (1939).
"7 State v. McClelland, 18 Neb. 236, 25 N.W. 77 (1885).
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favor of the enrolled bill rule. First, the claim that the legislative
journals are the "true" record is not sustained in legal theory:
The enrollment is only somebody's certificate and copy, because the
effective legal act of enactment is the dealing of the legislature with the
original document, e.g., the "viva voce" vote. The legislature has not dealt
by vote with the enrolled document; the latter therefore can only be a certifi-
cate and copy of the transactions representing the enactment. The enroll-
ment is thus not a record in the sense of a judicial record, i.e., the act done
in writing.
Furthermore, it is clear that the legislative journals are not the original
enactment, for the "viva voce" is not given upon them. They are but official
statements of what has been done at a prior time, although the House may
have heard them read and approved them as correct. Thus the question
whether an enrolled copy shall be conclusive as against the journal is only
a question whether an official report and copy of one degree of solemnity
and trustworthiness is to be preferred against another of a less degree.18
Second, the courts have taken judicial recognition of the hurry and
looseness by which the legislative journals are compiled; 19
There is required not a single guarantee to their accuracy or to their
truth; no one need vouch for them, and it is not enjoined that they should.
be either approved, copied or recorded.20
Since it is the general rule in the jurisdictions allowing the admission of
the journal entries that the courts will not take other testimony besides
the journal,2 there is the danger that errors in the journal will be
allowed to rebut the constitutionality of passage. The third and prin-
cipal argument against the enrolled bill rule is that of constitutional
necessity. It is drawn from the analogy of the judicial review of the
constitutionality of legislation, that is, if the courts will inquire into the
substance of the bill as to its constitutionality, they should also see
that the constitutional requisites relating to the procedure have not
been infringed. It is answered that this argument rests on the fallacy
that the judiciary is the sole enforcer of the constitution. Under the
separation of powers doctrine, the courts should not reach out beyond
their constitutional sphere to questions which, by constitutional direc-
tion, belong to the other departments of the government:
23
18 4 WIGMORE, EvmsEZcs § 1350 (3d ed. 1940).
10 State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 34 Pac. 201 (1893).2 0 Pangborn v. Young, 32 N.J.L. 29 (1866).
2182 C.J.S. Statutes, § 85 (1953).
22Price v. City of Moundsville, 43 W.Va. 523, 27 S.E. 218 (1897).
23 Gottstein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 Pac. 595 (1915).'
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Upon principle, then, in view of the division into departments under our
form of government, each of equal authority, one department cannot right-
fully go behind the final record certified to it or to the public from either of
the other departments. And the judicial department is no more justified in
going behind the final act of the legislature to see if it has obeyed every
mandatory provision of the constitution than has the legislature to go back
of the final record made by the courts to see whether or not they have com-
plied with all the constitutional requirements. 24
Another reason given in support of the conclusive presumption rule is
that if the enrolled bill were not conclusively presumed to be valid, it
would be impossible to ascertain rights and duties arising under a
statute until the courts have determined that all the steps required by
the constitution to properly enact it have been observed by the legisla-
ture:
The confusion as to rights and duties growing out of such a state of un-
certainty as to what the statute law of the state is may well appall one who
even superficially contemplates the same. 25
This "argument of convenience" has been conceded to be persuasive
even to those authorities which deny the separation of powers argument.
There are three opposing doctrines held among the jurisdictions
denying the conclusive presumption rule. The most generally accepted
is the extrinsic evidence rule2 1 which accords the enrolled bill a prima
facie presumption of validity, but permits attack by any clear, satis-
factory and convincing evidence in the journals establishing that the
constitutional requirements which the court deems mandatory have not
been met.-" Another variation is the affirmative contradiction rule:
Validity will be given to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively
appears in the journals a statement that there has not been compliance
with one or more of the constitutional requirements. 28 A view favored
by only a very few courts is the journal entry rule: If constitutional
compliance with the mandatory provisions are not set forth in the
record of the journals, there is a conclusive presumption that the proper
proceedings were not followed and thus the presumption is conclusively
24 State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452 at 464, 34 Pac. 201 at 205 (1893).
25 State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452 at 457, 34 Pac. 201 at 202 (1893).
26 The terminology adopted here is that in 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION, § 1402 (3d ed. 1943). While the courts as yet have not uniformly adopted these
terms, it appears that their use is gaining recognition.
27 E.g., State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266 (1879) ; People ex rel.
Monville v. Leddy, 53 Colo. 109, 123 Pac. 824 (1912).
28 E g., Young v. Galloway, 177 Ore. 617, 164 P.2d 427 (1945) ; State ex rel. Laseke
v. Friche, 126 Neb. 736, 254 N.W. 409 (1934).
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against the validity of the act.29 The ramifications and merits of these
various doctrines cannot be considered in the limited scope of this
article.
Although neither the Derby Club case nor the Roehi case have
effected any change in the Washington law as to the enrolled bill rule,
the cases are significant in that they reveal that four judges of the
Supreme Court have rejected the reasoning in State ex rel. Reed v.
Jones. Since the dissenting judges have not, in any of their opinions,
affirmatively advocated a substitute for the enrolled bill rule, it is
impossible to predict which doctrine would exist if their viewpoint
should prevail in some future case.
Right to Trial by Jury in Contempt Proceedings. The case of State
v. Boren,0 clarifies the law in respect to the defendant's right to trial
by jury under Washington's two contempt statutes, RCW 7.2G.010 and
RCW 9.23.010. The defendant was charged with contempt of court
by an information alleging that he had wilfully disobeyed a mandate
of the superior court. In pursuance to a previous decision of the
Supreme Court," a decree had been entered permanently enjoining
the defendant from practicing dentistry in this state without a license.
In the present action, the defendant was adjudged guilty of the con-
tempt charged. On appeal, he assigned as error the failure of the trial
court to accord him a jury trial. The Supreme Court held for the
defendant on this assignment of error and remanded the cause with
instructions to grant the defendant a jury trial.
RCW 7.20.010, et seq., defines contempt of court and provides for
the procedure to be followed in trying persons charged. The statute
is considered to embody the elements of common law contempt. The
general rule, which is followed. by the Washington court, is that the
defendant in a contempt proceeding is not entitled to a trial by jury."
The power of the court to punish summarily for contempt is deemed
to be inherent as an !essential auxiliary to the due administration of
justice."3 It has been said that the object of this power might be de-
feated if a jury trial were allowed.8' This summary jurisdiction has
been the subject of criticism by writers, but is zealously championed
by the courts themselves.
29 E.g., Neiberger v. McCullough, 253 III. -312, 97 N.E. 660 (1912) ; McClellan v.
Stein, 229 Mich. 203, 201 N.W. 209 (1924).
80 42 Wn2d 155, 253"P.2d 939 (1953).
B1State v. Boren, 36 Wn2d 552, 219 P2d 939 (1950).
32 50 C.J.S., Juries § 78 (1947).
88 17 C.J.S., Contempt § 43 (a) (1939).
84 COOLEY, CONSTITuTioAL LiurrATioNs 389 n. 2 (6th Ed., 1871).
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RCW 9.23.010 lists eight kinds of contempts that are misdemeanors.
It is the holding of the court in the principal case that a person charged
under this statute has a constitutional right to trial by jury, as he is
charged with a crime."3 The holding in this case in no way infringes
on the power of the court to proceed summarily under RCW 7.20.010.
While the statutes overlap, so that one act may be a contempt of court
under RCW 7.20.010 and also a misdemeanor under RCW 9.23.010,"
the procedural rights of the defendant depend upon whether he is
charged by affidavit, under RCW 7.20.010, or by indictment or infor-
mation, under RCW 9.23.010.
Since the latter statute became a part of the criminal code in 1909,"
there has been much confusion in the decisions, due to the court's
failure to clearly distinguish between the two statutes. Perhaps a good
deal of the confusion has been due to the fact that contempts of court
are generally classified as "civil" or "criminal." Civil contempts are
wrongs for which the law awards reparation to the injured party. In
the vast majority of cases, civil contempts are the result of a failure
of a party to a civil suit to comply with an order of the court made for
the benefit of the other party. Criminal contempts are acts done in
disrespect to the court or to its process, or which obstruct the admin-
istration of justice or tend to bring the court into disrespect. The
primary purpose of the prosecution for criminal contempts is to vindi-
cate the authority of the court. Since both in substance and in purpose
criminal contempts are analogous to ordinary criminal offenses, the
courts often refer to contempt proceedings as "quasi-criminal.""8 In
both civil and criminal contempt proceedings, the trial is by the court
and the defendant is subject to imprisonment or fine, or both, at the
discretion of the court. 9 The purpose of RCW 9.23.010 is not to
segregate criminal contempts from those over which the court has
summary jurisdiction, but rather to impose additional punishment for
those acts which, from a public policy standpoint, should not go un-
punished, in the event that the court should waive the contempt.'"
The semantic confusion, between contempts which are misdemeanors
35 WASH. CONST. ART. I, § 22.
36 No question as to double jeopardy has yet arisen. RCW 7.20.120 provides: "Per-
sons proceeded against according to the provisions of this chapter are also liable to
indictment or the filing of an information for the same misconduct, if it is an indictable
offense, but the court before which a conviction is had on the indictment or information
in passing sentence shall take into consideration the punishment before inflicted."
3 L. 1909, C. 249, § 120.
38 C. H. THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1934).
39 J. C. Fox, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1937).
40 See People ex rel. Sherwin v. Mead, 92 N.Y. 415 (1883).
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and criminal contempts, is apparent in the case of State ex rel. Dailey
v. Dailey," where the court stated:
Constitution Art. I, § 22, providing for trial by jury in all criminal cases
does not apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt under ... [RCW
9.23.010] .4
The court in the Boren case was able to distinguish the result in the
Dailey case on the ground that the proceeding was initiated by affidavit,
and therefore, came under RCW 7.20.010. The quoted statement is
thus dicta. In Blanckard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 8 the court
approvingly quoted the language of the Dailey case and discussed the
legislature's lack of power to interfere in the court's inherent right to
punish for contempt. However, this must also be treated as dicta, as
the proceeding was clearly under RCW 7.20.010. In State v. Bud-
dress," another action under RCW 7.20.010, the court erroneously
referred to RCW 9.23.010 as defining the elements of contempt of
court, which it does not do.
Only two cases have previously arisen under RCW 9.23.010. In
State v. Angevine," the defendant was charged by an information based
on § 7 of the statute---"Publication of a false or grossly inaccurate
report of [the court's] proceedings"-and was convicted after having
had a trial by jury. The concurring judge in that case made mention
of the distinction between the two contempt statutes. In the other case
arising under RCW 9.23.010, no question as to the right of trial by
jury was before the court, as the 4ppeal was from an order dismissing
the prosecution."
JOAN SMITH
Appeal-Proceeding in Forma Pauperis Within Discretion of Court. In an appeal
from a judgment denying a writ of habeas corpus, it was held, in In re Mason v.
Cranor, 42 Wn2d 610, 257 P.2d 211 (1953), that the constitutional right of an accused
to an appeal does not include, even in a capital case, the right for an impecunious
defendant to require the county to defray the cost of the appellate record. Stich allow-
ance is within the discretion of the trial court.
Right to Compel Attendance of Witnesses. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
the defendant, in In re Johnson v. Cranor, 143 Wash. Dec. 184, 260 P.2d 873 (1953),
claimed that the subpoenas issued in his behalf were defective in that they directed his
41164 Wash. 140, 2 P.2d 79 (1931).
42 Id. at 145, 2 P.2d at 81.
43188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936).
4 63 Wash. 26, 114 Pac. 879 (1911).
"104 Wash. 679, 177 Pac. 701 (1919).
4 State v. Lew, 25 Wn2d 854, 172 P2d 289 (1946).
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witnesses to appear on the day following the trial and that therefore he was convicted
without the benefit of testimony from his requested witnesses. The Supreme Court
referred the petition to the Superior Court to determine the facts, stating that if the
allegations were true, the defendant had been denied his constitutional rights unless
he had in some way waived those rights.
CONTRACTS
Implied Contracts-Expectation of Payment. Kerr v. King County,
was a case arising on a claim for payment made by employees who,
under an unenforceable contract, worked overtime on emergencies upon
expectancy of time off with pay later, but who were discharged before
such compensation took place. Recovery was denied.
The contemplation of the court seems to oscillate between contracts
implied in law and contracts implied in fact, and from the denial of
recovery it is to be deduced they found neither. The reasoning seems
to be confused but it appears that the court is disallowing an implied
in law contract on the authority of Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge
Authority' in which the recipient of the benefits already had an entitle-
ment thereto as a third party donee beneficiary of a collateral contract
thus, although the donee was enriched, the enrichment was not unjust.
In the Kerr case, however, there is nothing in the facts or opinion to
indicate how, or to what, the recipient was already entitled and the
enrichment seems to be made not unjust by the fiat of the court.
The implied-in-fact contract is disallowed on even stranger grounds.
By reference to an imposing list of cases involving implied contracts
between municipalities and employees or contractors, it is held that
expectations to pay and be paid are essential to recovery. This of course
is in keeping with the principal announced in Strong & MacDonald v.
King County' that "municipalities are bound by the same standard of
right and wrong that the law imposes upon individuals, and it is neither
equitable nor just that a municipality should have the benefit of the
property and labor of another without compensating that other there-
fore." The expectation of payment is necessary in the implied-in-law
contract in order to repel the idea of a gift or gratuitous service;" in the
implied-in-fact contract it is an integral part of the mental processes
making up the intent to contract.' In the Kerr opinion, however, the
142 Wn.2d 845, 259 P.2d 394 (1953).
217 Wn2d 591, 137 P.2d 97 (1943).
a 147 Wash. 678, 267 Pac. 436 (1928).
6 58 Am. Jur. 517 (note 4) ; Gross v. Cadwell, 4 Wash. 670, 30 Pac. 1052 (1892);
noted 54 A.L.R. 550 (1928).
5 Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wn.2d 128, 201 P.2d 129 (1948) and cases cited.
[MAY
